

HEADQUARTERS 3D BATTALION 8TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96265

470
LYNCH

AVDDA-BRAD

1 August 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J-3132)

THRU: Commanding Officer
1st Bde 4th Inf Div
ATTN: AVDDA-BRC
APO San Francisco 96265

TO: Commanding General
4th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDDH-CG
APO San Francisco 96262

UNCLASSIFIED	F O U O
BY: SFC Presley	LTC LYNCH
DATE: 19 July 71	5-31-81

- 1.(U) Name or identify and/or type of operation: FRANCIS MARION (DUC CO III): Search and Destroy Operation
- 2.(U) Dates of Operation: 231155 July 1967 to 231650 July 1967.
- 3.(U) Location: PLEI YA BO (YA 854200)
- 4.(U) Command Headquarters: Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
- 5.(U) Reporting Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P Lynch, CO, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
- 6.(C) Task Organization (during the actual contact):
 - A 3/8 Inf
 - B 3/8 Inf
 - C 3/8 Inf
 - C 6/29 Arty (105) (DS)
 - A 5/16 Arty (155 SP) (Reinforcing)
- 7.(C) Supporting Forces:
 - a. C/6/29 Arty (DS) provided close-in fire, firing a total of 1894 rounds in support of the operation.
 - b. A/5/16 Arty (Reinforcing 6/29 Arty) provided close-in and blocking fire, firing a total of 1488 rounds in support of the operation.
 - c. C/5/16 Arty (General Support Reinforcing) provided close-in, blocking and denial fires, firing a total of 1244 rounds in support of the operation.
 - d. D/5/16 Arty (General Support Reinforcing) provided close-in, blocking and denial fires, firing a total of 1047 rounds in support of the operation.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- e. A/6/14 Arty (General Support Reinforcing) provided close-in and blocking fires, firing a total of 27 rounds in support of the operation.
- f. B/6/14 Arty (General Support) provided close-in and blocking fires, firing a total of 596 rounds in support of the operation.
- g. C/6/14 Arty (General Support) provided close-in and blocking fires, firing a total of 31 rounds in support of the operation.
- h. B/4/42 Arty (DS 1/12 Inf) provided close-in, blocking and denial fires, firing a total of 361 rounds in support of the operation.
- i. Artillery fires were effective as blocking, harrasing and denial fires. During the contact and the night immediately following the contact, a total of 6688 rounds of artillery were fired.

j. Air: Requests for immediate and continuous air support were forwarded through the FAC to the Air Force. There were a total of 12 F-100 sorties flown during the actual period of engagement. Three of these were directed at troops in the open at corrdinate YA 855185. Ten NVA KIA were found in that vicinity during the subsequent sweep; however, it is undetermined as to whether they had been killed by artillery or air strikes. Five sorties were directed at troops in the open at coordinate YA 855190; twenty NVA KIA were found in that area. Two sorties were directed at an enemy escape route at coordinates YA 843184; results of these sorties are undetermined. An enemy base camp at coordinate YA 865185 was struck by 2 sorties; 21 NVA KIA were found in that vicinity. During the ensuing night, two comb+ skyspots were flown as part of the denial effort. One sortie was flown by an F-100 and was directed at coordinate YA 879201; the other sortie was flown by a B-57 and was directed at coordinate YA 887177. Results of the skyspots are unknown.

k. US Army Aviation:

(1) Gunship support was provided by D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and the Assault Platoon of the 119th Aviation Company, 52d Aviation Battalion. Throughout the contact a minimum of one pair of gunships remained on station immediately responsive to the requirements of the battalion commander.

(2) Lift support for the displacement of the reconnaissance platoon and A/3/8 Infantry was provided by the 189th Aviation Co and the 119th Aviation Company of the 52d Aviation Battalion and by elements of the 4th Aviation Battalion.

8.(C) Intelligence:

a. The terrain in the contact area is primarily single canopy with thick underbrush and secondary growth. The trees are about 50 feet tall and from 12-20 inches in diameter. Fields of fire are limited to about 30-50 meters except in the area of the C Co CP, vicinity coordinate YA854199. In this area fields of fire run up to 75 meters in the south, 300 meters in the north and east, and are unlimited in the west.

b. Weather at the time of the contact was hot and clear. Visibility was unlimited. During the night it was partly cloudy with light scattered showers.

c. The enemy units involved included the 4th, 5th and 6th battalions of the 32d NVA Regiment. Elements from all three battalions participated in the attack. Enemy strength of the combined force is estimated at between 1000 and 1200 personnel.

d. The enemy was heavily armed with AK 47's, RPD light machine guns and B40 rockets. RPG-7's were also used. 82mm and 60mm mortar fire was employed against C Company CP with negligible results due to rapid suppression by friendly artillery fire and airstrikes. One 82mm mortar was seen destroyed

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
by artillery fire, another was later captured by ground forces where it had been abandoned by the withdrawing enemy.

e. The morale and discipline of the NVA was considered high. They were well armed. Their uniforms were of khaki and included both short and long trousers. No distinction could be made or conclusions drawn as to who wore long or short trousers. There were some black PJ's worn under the khakis and a few of the enemy wore a mixture of black PJ's and khakis. Headgear included cloth bush hats, pith helmets, and woven bamboo with plastic coverings.

f. Enemy losses in addition to 184 NVA KIA (BC) are estimated at 150-200 KIA, 200-250 WIA for a total of 534-634 NVA casualties in the 32d NVA Regiment, thereby decreasing its combat strength by more than 50%. Additionally, 10 POW's were captured.

9.(C) Mission: 3/8 Infantry to establish a fire support base vicinity coordinates YA 891252 and conduct S & D operations and maintain surveillance in assigned AO.

10.(C) Concept of Operations: 3/8 Infantry established its fire support base at YA 891252 on 14 July 1967. B and C Companies then moved by foot from the fire support base to the western sector of the battalion's AO. The fire support base was initially secured by the reconnaissance platoon, mortar platoon and artillery personnel. A Company, OPCON to 1/12 Infantry on 14 July, returned to OPCON 3/8 Infantry on 160600 July 1967 and closed into the fire support base to assume the security mission and serve as battalion reserve.

11.(C) Execution:

a. Events prior to the contact:

(1) The mission of B & C Companies for 23 July 1967 was to patrol from established company bases vicinity coordinate YA 853199 (B Co) and YA 856197 (C Co). A Co, located at the battalion's fire base was in reserve. Further guidance concerning the mission was disseminated by the following pertinent messages.

221715 July: Advised B and C Companies of possible NVA activity to the south and west of their location (based upon intelligence of a "Snoopy" aircraft).

221923 July: B and C Companies were notified to hold their patrols on the 23d until notified by the battalion CO.

230700 July: B and C Companies were directed to initiate reconnaissance patrolling when ready.

(2) At 230905 July, three reconnaissance patrols departed B Co CP and proceeded north, northwest and southwest. At the same time, three patrols of C Co departed the company CP and patrolled to the southwest and south. The disposition of B and C company at the time of the initial contact (231155 July) is as indicated in inclosure 1.

b. Events during the contact: The following is a chronological sequence of events which occurred during the period of the contact.

231150 July: 3d Platoon, returning to the C Company CP from the south observed 2 NVA to the platoon's north vicinity coordinates YA 855190. The platoon immediately pursued while the company commander directed the 1st Platoon to maneuver to a blocking position. At the same time the 2d Platoon was returning to the company CP.

231155 July: The platoon leader of 3d Platoon, Company C reported that the platoon was cut off and surrounded. The company commander

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ordered the 1st Platoon to the relief of the 3d Platoon; however the 1st Platoon came under intensive small arms and mortar fire and was pinned down, precluding the directed relief. At this time the C Company Commander ordered the 2d Platoon, now some 800 meters southwest of the company perimeter to hold in place.

231205 July: B Company was directed to regroup and be prepared to assist C Company.

231206 July: The first immediate air arrived on station armed with 20mm cannon only, having delivered its bomb load prior to the contact in another area. The aircraft stayed on station at the contact area to cover with the 20mm cannon.

231207 July: C Company's 3d Platoon Leader reported his platoon sergeant and RTO had been killed. Immediately thereafter all communication with the platoon was lost.

231216 July: C Company CP received 7-8 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Simultaneously, one NVA was captured at the C Company CP location.

231220 July: B Company was directed to linkup with C Company.

231225 July: B Company received automatic weapons fire from the southeast.

231230 July: B Company started moving toward C Company CP.

231235 July: The first ground attack was initiated against C Company's CP. At this time the gunships were ordered in to fire south of C Company's CP. The ground attack was repelled by a combination of close combat, artillery and gunship fire and the enemy withdrew south/southwest.

231237 July: B Company started receiving mortar and small arms weapons fire, temporarily pinning the unit down; however, it was ordered to continue moving and effect its link-up with C Company MSiP. The company started moving again.

231240 July: A second ground attack was initiated against the C Company CP. Again the NVA were repelled by close combat, artillery and gunship fires. Reinforcements arriving from B Company contributed to repelling the enemy during this attack.

231245 July: B Company effected its link-up with C Company. The first fully loaded Air Force aircraft arrived on the scene.

231254 July: B Company counterattacked southeast and south from the C Company perimeter. Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was placed on standby alert for commitment to the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, in event A Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was committed to the battle.

231306 July: B Company, sweeping south and southeast continued to receive sporadic small arms fire.

231320 July: An airstrike was executed against enemy in the open at coordinates YA 855185.

231340 July: An airstrike was executed against enemy troops in open at coordinates YA 855190.

231350 July: B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was placed OPCON to 3/8 Infantry and directed to move to the contact area.

231417 July: B Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry(Mech) was placed OPCON to 3/8 Infantry and directed to move to the contact area.

231445 July: A Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was airlifted into the battle area. Lift terminated at 231510.

231445 July: An airstrike was executed against enemy troops in the open at coordinates YA 855190.

231500 July: CO, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry ordered B and C Companies to sweep the area, then dig in and remain in the battle area overnight.

231527 July: A tank from B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

hit a mine at coordinates YA 857230, temporarily halting the progress of the troop closing on the contact area.

231527 July: 2d Platoon, Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry linked up with the remainder of the 3d Platoon of C Company. At this time it was verified that both the platoon leader and platoon sergeant of the 3d Platoon had been killed.

231530 July: Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry closed with C Company's 2d and 3d Platoons. Company A was directed to move to vicinity coordinates YA 854195 at this time.

231538 July: B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10 Cavalry continued to move to the area of contact. Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry prepared to move to secure the mined tank of B/1/10 Cavalry which was left in place with a platoon of the cavalry troop.

231615 July: Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry became OPCON to 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry and was directed to establish a blocking position vicinity coordinates YA 839188.

231630 July: An airstrike was placed against a suspected enemy base camp vicinity YA 865185. (Area was later confirmed as a base camp and 22 NVA KIA were found at that location).

231645 July: Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was airlifted to the location of the mined tank. Simultaneously, the last lift of Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry arrived at the battalion fire support base to provide necessary security. These lifts were both completed at 231650.

c. Events which occurred after the contact:

231740 July: B/1/10 Cavalry linked up with Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry at coordinate YA 850198. Then both units moved to YA 853198 and established a night location. C Company remained at its established company CP throughout the night.

231830 July: One platoon was detached from B/1/10 Cavalry and attached to Company C.

231900 July: B Company closed its night location vicinity YA 857224.

231930 July: B/2/8 Infantry (Mech) closed into night location vicinity YA 839188.

Throughout the night immediately following the contact, H & I artillery fires and blocking fires continued to be fired into the contact area at a high rate. These fires were controlled by the artillery LNO, on location, in the contact area. Company C was returned to the battalion fire base on 24 July. For several days following the contact, S & D operations were continued by A Co, B Co, B/1/10 Cavalry and B/2/8 Infantry (Mech) in an effort to regain contact with the enemy and further to accomplish a thorough police of the battlefield, including the burning of enemy dead and recovery of enemy weapons.

12.(C) Results:

a. Enemy losses: 184 NVA KIA (BC), 8 NVA WIA (POW), 2 NVA POW uninjured, 31 AK 47, 9 RPD, 11 SKS, 7 B40, 2 RPG-7, 2 82mm Mortar, 1 P-38 Pistol, 1 Soviet Carbine (53), 79 hand grenades, 10 anti-tank grenades, 28 B-40 rockets, 10 RPG-7 rockets, 9 82mm mortar rounds, 1 Bangalore Torpedo, 2 satchel charges, 15 82mm mortar fuzes, 1 FM Radio complete with hand and head set, 13,720 rounds small arms ammunition, 60 canteens with cover, 40 ponchos, 30 ammunition packs, 35 packs, 42 hammocks, 17 helmets, 1½ mile wire, 15 blocks TNT, 23 aid packets, 67 entrenching tools, 78 magazines and assorted individual clothing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

b. Friendly losses: 19 MIA; 11 B Co, 16 C Co, 1 6/29 Arty, 1 Hq Co; 37 evacuated WIA (14 B Co, 22 C Co, 1 6/29 Arty); 16 WIA not evacuated (C Co); 0 MIA; 21 M-16; 3 GAR-15; 3 M79; 3 pair binoculars; 1 shotgun; 4 M2 Compasses; 17 lensatic compasses; 5 wristwatches.

13.(C) Administrative Matters:

a. Supply: Resupply was initiated on 23 July and was limited to ammunition and water. The 24th of July was a full resupply day for A and B Companies in the field.

b. Basic Load Data: All combat troops in the field carried the following basic load of ammunition: M-16 - 600 rounds, M-60 - 2000 rounds, M-79 - 50 rounds(HE), Shotgun 100-200 rounds.

c. Initial treatment of injured was conducted by organic medics. All WIA were evacuated to Jackson Hole, except for minor injuries on 23 July NLT 1800 hours.

d. Transportation: N/A

e. Communications: Communication was maintained with the companies by direct means. No communication difficulties were encountered throughout the contact. Communication was continuous.

f. Medical Evaluation: Of the US WIA, ten were considered serious. Nine were returned to duty and the remainder were evacuated to higher facilities.

14.(C) Special Equipment: None

15.(C) Commander's analysis: There were no civil affairs activities conducted.

16. Recommendation: Contained in lessons learned.

17. Lessons Learned: See attached lesson learned formats.

ACKNOWLEDGE: 16; 3 GAR-15; 3 M79; 3 pair binoculars; 1 shotgun; 4 M2 Compasses; 17 lensatic compasses; 5 wristwatches.

18.(C) Administrative Matters:

THOMAS P LYNCH
LTC, Armor
Commanding

a. Supply: Resupply was initiated on 23 July and was limited to ammunition and water. The 24th of July was a full resupply day for A and B Companies in the field.

b. Basic Load Data: All combat troops in the field carried the following basic load of ammunition: M-16 - 600 rounds, M-60 - 2000 rounds, M-79 - 50 rounds(HE), Shotgun 100-200 rounds.

c. Initial treatment of injured was conducted by organic medics. All WIA were evacuated to Jackson Hole, except for minor injuries on 23 July NLT 1800 hours.

d. Transportation: N/A

e. Communications: Communication was maintained with the companies by direct means. No communication difficulties were encountered throughout the contact. Communication was continuous.

f. Medical Evaluation: Of the US WIA, ten were considered serious. Nine were returned to duty and the remainder were evacuated to higher facilities.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14.(C) Special Equipment: None

15.(C) Commander's analysis: There were no civil affairs activities conducted.

16. Recommendation: Contained in lessons learned.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 August 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report (RCS: MACV J-3132)

11 Incl


1. Terrain Sketch - Contact Area
2. Combat Lesson Learned - Conduct Training in Foreign Weapons
3. Combat Lesson Learned - When patrolling from a company base, leave claymore mines employed around the base.
4. Combat Lesson Learned - Units should carry a "heavy" basic load of small arms ammunition for individual and crew served weapons while conducting S & D operations.
5. Combat Lesson Learned - Small units which are separated from their parent unit should change to the battalion frequency to facilitate the most effective command and control.
6. Combat Lesson Learned - Insure that a separate supply of small arms ammunition, claymores and grenades is on hand on the fire support base perimeter.
7. Combat Lesson Learned - A requirement exists for a concealable radio antenna.
8. Combat Lesson Learned - Overhead cover in open areas should be either of a very low silhouette or not utilized.
9. Combat Lesson Learned - Considerable evidence exists that NVA reserve elements normally follow from 1500-2000 meters behind their main attacking force.
10. Combat Lesson Learned - It is essential that a sweep be made in depth, immediately after a contact, to determine with validity the number of enemy dead and to capture those enemy wounded still in the battle area.
11. Combat Lesson Learned - Adjustment of close-in artillery fires from 200-400 meters from the perimeter edge is to be accomplished by the artillery FO on the ground. All other fires including blocking, TAC Air, and gunships should be controlled by the battalion commander.

DISTRIBUTION:
"SPECIAL"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Inclusura 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Combat Lesson Learned: Conduct training in foreign weapons.

Item: Employment of fallen enemy weapons against the enemy.

Discussion: During the contact, some personnel of B and C Companies were forced to use available NVA weapons due to damage to their own weapons.

Observation: NVA weapons were used effectively by friendly forces against the NVA.

2. Supporting Facts:

a. Source of information: Company Commanders, 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

b. Unit: B and C Companies, 3d Bn 8th Inf.

c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.

d. Date: 23 July 1967.

e. Location: YA854197

f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.

g. Enemy: Type: NVA.
Estimated strength: Regiment.
Disposition: Above ground, moving.

h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Bn, 8th Inf initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.

i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours.

j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes.

k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: Because of the intense contact and close combat of the action, some individuals were forced to utilize enemy weapons after their individual weapons were damaged. Due to prior familiarization with enemy weapons the infantrymen were able to effectively use the NVA weapons. Weapons employed included the AK-47, the SKS and the RPD light machine gun. Knowledge of these weapons undoubtedly reduced friendly casualties and increased enemy casualties.

Inclosure 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Combat Lessons Learned: When patrolling from a company base, leave claymores employed around the base.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Item: Employment of claymore mines around a company patrol base.

Discussion: During the contact, Company B and Company C were operating as patrol bases repelled reported ground attacks against their perimeters. Emplaced claymore mines contributed to repelling the enemy.

Observation: Correctly employed claymore mines were very effective against enemy ground attacks in relatively open areas.

2. Supporting Facts:

a. Source of Information: Company Commanders, 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

b. Unit: B and C Companies, 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission. Specifically, defense of a company patrol base was being conducted which contributed this lesson learned.

d. Date: 23 July 1967

e. Location: YA854197.

f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.

g. Enemy: Type: NVA.

Estimated Strength: Regiment:

Disposition: Attacking across open terrain.

h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Bn, 8th Inf initiated contact while patrolling. The enemy force then continued the contact by attacking the company patrol base.

i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours.

j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes.

k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: Company C, 3d Bn, 8th Infantry had left their claymores emplaced prior to the contact. Consequently, the platoon securing the company base was able to sustain its defense and repel ground attacks from a numerically superior enemy force until reinforced by Company B. The devastating effect of the emplaced claymores and their instant availability contributed significantly to repelling those attacks. It is highly desirable therefore, when operating from a company base, to leave claymores in place daily and change their positions just prior to darkness.

Inclosure 3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Combat Lesson Learned: Units should carry a "heavy" basic load of small arms ammunition for individual and crew served weapons while conducting S & D operations.

Item: Basic load of ammunition for individual and crew served weapons.

Discussion: Prior to and during the contact, Company C and Company B had more than the normal basic load of ammunition for individual and crew served weapons on hand.

Observation: Company B and Company C carried considerably more than a normal basic load of small arms ammunition. It is doubtful that they could have sustained themselves through the contact, which lasted more than four hours, had they had a normal basic load of ammunition.

2. Supporting Facts:

a. Source of Information: Battalion and Company Commanders, 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

b. Unit: 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.

d. Date: 23 July 1967.

e. Location: YA854197

f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.

g. Enemy: Type: NVA.

Estimated Strength: Regiment.

Disposition: Above ground, moving.

h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Bn, 8th Inf initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.

i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours.

j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes.

k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: Prior to the contact the Battalion Commander had established a SOP that the companies would carry a minimum of 600 rounds per M16, 2000 rounds per M60, 50 rounds per M79 grenade launcher and as many grenades as possible. It was later determined that the NVA carried approximately 100 rounds per SKS, 150 rounds

Inclosure 4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
per AK-47 and four rockets per launcher (B-40 and RPG-7). Because B and C Companies were carrying this "heavy" basic load, they were able to sustain themselves during the period of contact and gain small arms fire superiority.

Inclosure 4.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Combat Lesson Learned: Small units which are separated from their parent unit should change to the battalion frequency to facilitate the most effective command and control.

Item: Command and control of small units separated from their parent unit.

Discussion: During the contact, some elements of the companies were separated and could not close with their parent unit.

Observation: Effective command and control was maintained because these elements changed to the battalion frequency. Artillery and air support could therefore be effectively employed because the location and disposition of these elements was at all times known.

2. Supporting Facts:

a. Source of information: Battalion and company commanders, 3d Bn, 8th Infantry.

b. Unit: B and C Companies, 3d Bn, 8th Infantry.

c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S. & D mission.

d. Date: 23 July 1967

e. Location: YA854197

f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.

g. Enemy: Type: NVA
Estimated Strength: Regiment
Disposition: Above-ground, moving.

h. How contact was made: The Third platoon of Company C, 3d Bn, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging and NVA security element.

i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours

j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours 55 minutes

k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson is drawn: Prior to the contact, a battalion SOP had been established that required elements separated from their parent unit during a contact to switch to the battalion frequency when so directed. This procedure enabled the battalion commander and artillery liaison officer to most effectively control and support by fire the separated units. In one case, a squad of B Co was separated from the company by some distance. Since the main element of the company was in contact, the company commander directed the squad leader to change to the battalion frequency. In another situation, a platoon was separated from C Co because the platoon and the company were both in heavy contact in separate

Inlosure 5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
areas. In both cases the exact location of the separated elements was known and direct coordination of fires was affected between the separated units and the battalion commander on the battalion frequency.

Inclosure 5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Combat Lesson Learned: Insure that a separate supply of small arms ammunition, claymores and grenades is on hand on the fire support base perimeter.

Item: Ammunition available on the fire support base perimeter.

Discussion: During the contact, Co A, the company assigned the mission of security of the fire support base, was rapidly committed to the contact area, requiring other forces to secure the perimeter.

Observation: Because an independent supply of small arms ammunition, claymores and grenades was on hand at the defensive positions on the fire support base perimeter, there was no decrease in the effectiveness of the defenses of the perimeter because of ammunition shortages.

2. Supporting Facts:

- a. Source of information: Battalion Commander, 3d Bn, 8th Infantry
- b. Unit: 3d Bn, 8th Infantry
- c. Activity being conducted: Relief of a company securing a fire support base perimeter by other personnel within the fire support base and later by another company.
- d. Date: 23 July 1967
- e. Location: YA892251
- f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.
- g. Enemy: Type: NVA
Estimated Strength: Regiment
Disposition: Above ground, moving
- h. How contact was made: N/A
- i. Time of initial contact: N/A
- j. Length of time in contact: N/A
- k. How contact was broken: N/A

1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: During the contact, the decision was made to reinforce the units in contact by commitment of the security company for the battalion fire support base. Because necessary small arms, grenades and claymores were stockpiled on the fire support base perimeter, the original company was able to rapidly deploy with its basic load while leaving the defensive positions of the fire support base intact and instantly effective for the relieving force.

Inclosure 6

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Combat Lesson Learned: A requirement exists for a concealable radio antenna.

Item: Portable radio antenna signature.

Discussion: The antenna of the portable is readily identifiable by enemy forces.

Observation: Enemy forces concentrate their fires on radio operators and leaders, knowing that friendly forces will be less effective without these personnel. The radio antenna helps identify the radio operator.

2. Supporting Facts:

- a. Source of information: Company Commanders, 3d Bn 8th Infantry
- b. Unit: 3d Bn 8th Infantry
- c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.
- d. Date: 23 July 1967
- e. Location: YA854197
- f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.
- g. Enemy: Type: NVA
Estimated Strength: Regiment
Disposition: Above ground, moving.
- h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.
- i. Time of initial contact: 1255 hours
- j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours 55 minutes
- k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.
- l. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: During the contact the radio operator of the third platoon of Company C was killed immediately after the contact began. The platoon leader, who was later also killed, operated the radio but stated that the NVA had him and the radio zeroed in.

Inclosure 7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Combat Lesson Learned: Overhead cover in open areas should be either of a very low silhouette or not utilized. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Item: Overhead cover in open areas.

Discussion: Construction of an overhead cover provides an increased target size for B40 rocket launchers. These launchers are a greater threat to the security of a friendly perimeter than mortars, due to the pinpoint accuracy of the launcher. Therefore, all overhead cover should provide the lowest possible silhouette or overhead should not be utilized.

Observation: NVA B-40 Rocket fires were relatively ineffective during the contact because there were no suitable targets. C Company had no overhead and its open positions were difficult to detect in the grass.

2. Supporting Facts:

- a. Source of information: Company Commander, 3d Bn 8th Infantry
- b. Unit: 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
- c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.
- d. Date: 23 July 1967
- e. Location: YA854197
- f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.
- g. Enemy: Type: NVA
Estimated Strength: Regiment
Disposition: Above ground, moving.
- h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.
- i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours
- j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes.
- k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.
- l. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: Many B-40 rocket rounds landed within the Company C perimeter causing some casualties; however, it is felt that casualties were minimal because there were no hard targets for the B-40's.

Inclosure 8

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Combat lesson learned: Considerable evidence exists that NVA reserve elements normally follow from 1500-2000 meters behind their main attacking force.

Item: Location of NVA reserve elements.

Discussion: A knowledge of the location of enemy reserves can facilitate total destruction of an enemy force.

Observation: Artillery and airstrikes at a distance of from 1500-2000 meters from the main contact area caused many casualties among NVA personnel. It is considered that these personnel were the reserves for the attacking forces.

2. Supporting Facts:

- a. Source of information: Battalion Commander, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
- b. Unit: 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
- c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.
- d. Date: 23 July 1967
- e. Location: YA854197
- f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.
- g. Enemy: Type: NVA
Estimated Strength: Regiment
Disposition: Above ground, moving
- h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.
- i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours
- k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.
1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: Visual reconnaissance substantiated considerable movement of enemy personnel at distances of up to 2000 meters from the main contact area. Artillery and airstrikes were placed on these targets. Later, large numbers of enemy casualties were found at these locations.

Inclosure 9

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Combat Lesson Learned: It is essential that a sweep be made in depth, immediately after a contact, to determine with validity the number of enemy dead and to capture those enemy wounded still in the battle area.

Item: Sweep of battle area after a contact.

Discussion: Immediately after a heavy contact, there may be many enemy wounded still within the contact area. Furthermore, many of the enemy dead may not have been evacuated. An immediate sweep will facilitate capturing these wounded and getting an accurate count of the dead. Because of the NVA's obsession with a meticulous police of their dead, a sweep of a few days later will determine that the NVA have already policed up their dead and no wounded enemy survivors remain.

Observation: The day following the contact, the battalion was committed to another mission which precluded a thorough sweep of the battle area. It was not until three days after the contact that a thorough sweep could be made. By this time there was considerable evidence that the NVA had dragged away many bodies and policed the battle area of enemy survivors.

2. Supporting Facts:

- a. Source of information: Battalion Commander, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.
- b. Unit: 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
- c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on D & D mission.
- d. Date: 23 July 1967
- e. Location: YA854197
- f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility
- g. Enemy: Type: NVA
Estimated Strength: Regiment
Disposition: Above ground, moving
- h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.
- i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours
- j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes
- k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

Inclosure 10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: The day following the contact, the battalion was committed to another mission which precluded a thorough sweep of the battle area. It was not until three days after the contact that a thorough sweep could be made. By this time there was considerable evidence that the NVA had dragged away many bodies and policed the battle area of enemy survivors.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Inclosure 10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Combat Lesson Learned: Adjustment of close-in artillery fires from 200-400 meters from the perimeter edge is to be accomplished by the artillery FO on the ground. All other fires including blocking, TAC Air, and gunships should be controlled by the battalion commander.

Item: Control and adjustment of supporting fires.

Discussion: The company commander on the ground does not have the time during a contact, nor the knowledge of the overall situation, to control blocking fires of artillery or the fires of Tac Air and gunships. For the preservation of his perimeter, the company commander must guide the FO in adjustment of artillery fires around the immediate perimeter.

Observation: During the contact, the company FO's adjusted artillery fires around their immediate perimeter. The battalion commander employed blocking fires on avenues of approach and withdrawal, as well as Tac Air and gunships on known and suspected enemy locations. In this manner the most effective utilization was made of supporting fires.

2. Supporting Facts:

- a. Source of information: Battalion Commander, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.
- b. Unit: 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
- c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.
- d. Date: 23 July 1967
- e. Location: YAC 54197
- f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.
- g. Enemy: Type: NVA
Estimated Strength: Regiment
Disposition: Above ground, moving
- h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.
- i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours
- j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes
- k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

Inclosure 11

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: During the contact, the company FO's adjusted artillery fires around their immediate perimeter. The battalion commander employed blocking fires on avenues of approach and withdrawal, as well as Tac Air and gunships on known and suspected enemy locations. In this manner the most effective utilization was made of supporting fires.

Inclosure 11

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~